



# Bridging Statistical and Logical Perspectives on Inconsistency

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## Introduction

Inconsistency in real-world data is handled very differently across fields:

- **Logic & KR:** the principle of explosion makes classical reasoning collapse under inconsistency; **repair-based semantics** (AR, CAR, ...) restore meaningful inference via maximally consistent subsets.
- **Statistics:** a *deterministic model* encoding the ideal logical rule is relaxed with an **error layer**, assigning non-zero probability to all observations and enabling likelihood-based inference.

**Contribution:** A unified framework formalizing statistical inconsistency in logical terms, enabling direct comparison of repair-based semantics and statistical models.

## Unified Framework

- **Statistical Model:**  $\mathcal{M} = (\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \Theta, \{P_\theta\})$ ,  
 $\mathcal{X}$ : input space,  $\mathcal{Y}$ : output space,  $\Theta$ : parameter space,  $\{P_\theta\}$ : parametric family.
- **Induced Logical Framework:**  $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{M} = (\Theta, \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}, \models)$  defined by:  

$$\theta \models (x, y) \iff y \in \text{supp}(P_\theta(Y \mid X = x)).$$
- **Interpretations:**  $\theta \in \Theta$ . | **Assertions:**  $(x, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ .

A dataset  $\mathcal{D}$  is **inconsistent** with  $\mathcal{M}$  iff  $L(\theta \mid \mathcal{D}) = 0$ ,  $\forall \theta \in \Theta$ .

**Key equivalence:**

$\mathcal{D}$  is inconsistent with  $\mathcal{M} \iff \mathcal{D}$  is unsatisfiable in  $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{M}$ .

This correspondence enables **repair-based semantics** for statistical datasets.

**Repair:**  $R \subseteq \mathcal{D}$  is a maximal consistent subset (inclusion- or cardinality-maximal).

- **AR:**  $\mathcal{D} \models_{\text{AR}} f \iff \forall R \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{D}), R \models f$ .
- **CAR:**  $\mathcal{D} \models_{\text{CAR}} f \iff \forall R \in \mathcal{R}(\text{cl}(\mathcal{D})), R \models f$ .

**Statistical view:** cardinality repairs  $\equiv$  minimal deletions  $\equiv$  error minimization.

## Binary Classification

**Goal:** classify unseen  $x$  under data inconsistent with a monotonicity assumption, i.e. given  $x$ , try to deduce  $(x, 0)$  or  $(x, 1)$ .

- **Data:**  $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}$ , with  $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}$  and  $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1\}$ .
- **Deterministic model:** threshold  $\theta \in \mathbb{R}$  separates two classes:

$$P_\theta(Y = y \mid X = x) = \mathbf{1}\{(x > \theta, y = 1) \vee (x \leq \theta, y = 0)\}.$$


Inconsistency occurs when monotonicity is violated ( $y = 1$  points left of  $y = 0$  points).

- **Error model:** logistic regression  $P_{\theta,s}(Y = 1 \mid X = x) = \sigma((x - \theta)/s)$ , by MLE.
- **Repairs:** inclusion-maximal repairs are threshold-indexed consistent subsets

$$R_{x_j} = \{(x_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{D} \mid x_i \leq x_j, y_i = 0 \vee x_i > x_j, y_i = 1\}.$$

Cardinality repairs minimize deletions; AR yields safe prediction intervals.

- **Experiments:** 201 labeled points in  $[-10, 10]$ ; compare logistic regression and cardinality-AR predictions of unseen  $x$  under different inconsistency levels.




**High constant noise:** cardinality-AR **outperforms** logistic regression, being robust to distant mislabelled points. **Logistic noise:** comparable accuracy.

## Pairwise Preferences

**Goal:** infer missing pairwise comparisons from  $N$  assessors expressing partial preferences over  $n$  items, under cycle-induced inconsistency, i.e., given an assessor  $k$  and a pair of items  $(i, j)$ , try to deduce  $i \succ j$  or  $j \succ i$ .

The preference graph for each assessor contains items as nodes and comparisons as directed edges; cycles represent violations of transitivity and inconsistency.



- **Data:**  $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_i$ , where  $\mathcal{X} = \{(i, j) : i < j \leq n\}$  represents item pairs and  $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1\}$  comparison outcomes:  $y = 0$  means  $i \succ j$ , while  $y = 1$  means  $j \succ i$ .
- **Deterministic model:** a ranking  $\rho \in S_n$  determines all pairwise preferences:  

$$P_\rho(Y = y \mid X = (i, j)) = \mathbf{1}\{(\rho_i < \rho_j, y = 1) \vee (\rho_j < \rho_i, y = 0)\}.$$


- **Error model: Mallows model with Bernoulli noisy pair comparisons.**

Each assessor  $k$  has a latent ranking  $\pi_k$  sampled around a consensus ranking  $\rho$ :

$$P(\pi_k \mid \rho, \alpha) \propto \exp(-\alpha \cdot d(\pi_k, \rho)).$$

Pair comparisons are generated from  $\pi_k$  and flipped with error probability  $p \leq 1/2$ . Bayesian inference estimates  $\{\pi_k\}_{k=1}^N$ ,  $\rho$ , and  $p$  to predict missing comparisons.

- **Repairs:** maximal acyclic subgraphs of the preference graph.
  - **Inclusion-AR:** cycle hitting-set feasibility (coNP-hard).
  - **Cardinality-AR:** Minimum Feedback Arc Set (NP-hard).
  - **CAR:** polynomial post-processing of AR deductions.
- **Experiments:**  $N = 200$  assessors,  $n = 20$  items, with inconsistencies wrt full rankings. We compare Mallows estimated probabilities for each pair comparison with: relative frequencies in the original dataset and in the cardinality-CAR deductions dataset.



CAR deductions are **more correlated** with Mallows posteriors than raw comparisons, indicating compatible repairs. Under **low inconsistency**, Mallows may over-pool assessors and favour non-optimal repairs. Under **high inconsistency**, this effect is reduced, and Mallows prioritizes optimal repairs over population pooling.

## Conclusions and Future Work

- Statistical inconsistency and logical unsatisfiability are **formally equivalent** under  $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{M}$ .
- **Cardinality-based repairs** are the logical counterpart of **likelihood-based error minimisation**: a bridge between the two fields.
- The two paradigms act at **different levels**: statistics is *inferential and completion-oriented* – it assumes latent structure with noise; logic is *conservative but structurally expressive* – it retains only what is deductively entailed.
- The approaches are **complementary**: logic for deterministic rules, statistics for population-level uncertainty.

**Future work:** richer statistical models (continuous variables); structured observations (disjunctions, implications, rank constraints) beyond atomic facts; population-level repair semantics; broader notions of statistical inconsistency.

